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Note 
 
A Step in the Right Direction: Patent Damages 
and the Elimination of the Entire Market Value 
Rule 
Jaimeson Fedell*
Yasuo Kamatani is an immensely successful entrepreneur.
 
1 
Mr. Kamatani is the sole inventor of patent ‘981, a device that 
automatically identifies the type of disc—either a CD or DVD—
inserted in a computer’s optical disc drive (ODD).2 He founded 
LaserDynamics, Inc. for the sole purpose of licensing his ‘981 
patent to computer manufacturers.3 By 2003, ODDs with au-
tomatic disc discrimination had become the industry standard, 
making his ‘981 patent a valuable commodity.4 As a result, 
from 1998 to 2010, LaserDynamics entered into 29 licensing 
agreements for the use of the ‘981 patent, the majority of which 
were less than $250,000 and all of which were less than $1 mil-
lion.5 The only licensing agreement to exceed $1 million was a 
$6 million settlement with BenQ Corporation after a two-year 
patent lawsuit.6 It is therefore easy to imagine Mr. Kamatani’s 
pleasant surprise when, in 2009, a jury awarded his corpora-
tion a verdict of $52 million in a patent infringement suit 
against Quanta Computer, Inc.7
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A. 2010, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. I would like to thank Professor Cotter for 
his help in selecting a topic and his invaluable comments on my drafts. Many 
thanks to the members of the Minnesota Law Review for helping me publish 
this Note. Copyright © 2014 by Jaimeson Fedell. 
 This figure, based on the entire 
market value rule, was more than fifty times greater than any 
 1. See LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 57 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 2. Id. at 56. 
 3. Id. at 57. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 57–58.  
 6. Id. at 58; see also Kamatani v. BenQ Corp., No. 2:03–CV–437, 2005 
WL 2455825, *6–7 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2005). 
 7. See LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 63. 
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of LaserDynamics’s previous licensing agreements and almost 
ten times what the company had received in previous infringe-
ment litigation.8
In a troubling development, corporations like 
LaserDynamics have been invoking the entire market value 
rule in calculating patent damages in an attempt to reap huge 
jury verdicts.
 
9 By statute, damages for patent infringement 
should be “in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use 
made of the invention by the infringer.”10 In an attempt to clari-
fy this somewhat ambiguous provision, the Supreme Court in-
vented a concept commonly known as the entire market value 
rule: if the entire value of a device is properly and legally at-
tributable to the patent, then the entire value of the product 
can be used to calculate royalties.11
Although this rule may have been sensible in 1884, at a 
time when inventions were far less complex, it seems antiquat-
ed today when new devices incorporate hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of patents.
 For example, if a jury de-
termined that the automatic disc discrimination feature con-
tained in Mr. Kamatani’s patent was the overwhelming reason 
consumers purchased a laptop computer, then the revenue the 
infringer obtained from those laptops would be multiplied by a 
royalty rate to calculate damages.  
12 With Congressional silence on the issue of 
damages,13 the Federal Circuit has recently become more proac-
tive in limiting the application of the entire market value rule 
to only those instances where the patented features constitute 
the entire basis for customer demand.14
 
 8. Id. Quanta argued that the damages should be $500,000, a figure 
much more representative of the previous licensing agreements that 
LaserDynamics had obtained, but the jury accepted at face value the conten-
tion of LaserDynamics’s damages expert that the award should be $52 million. 
Id. at 61–63. 
 However, even with a 
 9. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1301 
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1323 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 10. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
 11. Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (“The patentee . . . must 
show . . . that the profits and damages are to be calculated on the whole ma-
chine, for the reason that the entire value of the whole machine, as a market-
able article, is properly and legally attributable to the patented feature.”). 
 12. See Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire 
Market Value Rule, 60 STAN. L. REV. 263, 264 (2007). 
 13. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2012).  
 14. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336. 
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more vigilant Federal Circuit, the entire market value rule still 
contains the potential to award companies’ damages on value 
they did not create because of the extreme difficulty in deter-
mining which patent is actually driving the demand for a prod-
uct.15
This Note argues that the entire market value rule is an 
obsolete conception because it can award companies for value 
they did not create. Accordingly, the rule should be abandoned 
entirely and replaced with reasonable royalty calculations that 
focus on past licensing agreements if they are available. Part I 
describes the background of the entire market value rule and 
how it has evolved over time, particularly with the recent deci-
sions in LaserDynamics and Uniloc. Part II addresses the criti-
cisms of the entire market value rule and how it can give rise to 
exorbitant damages calculations by using the entire value of a 
product as a base rate, as well as examines several potential al-
ternatives to the entire market value rule. Finally, this Note 
concludes that the most appropriate solution is to abolish the 
entire market value rule and look toward the fifteen-factor test 
first identified in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Ply-
wood Corp.
  
16
I.  THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE AND PATENT 
DAMAGES   
 
Patent damages exist to compensate the patentee for in-
fringement and to make him or her whole after the infringe-
ment.17 The United States Patent Act states that upon finding 
for the claimant, a court shall award damages “adequate to 
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the in-
fringer.”18
 
 15. Patricia Dyck, Note, Beyond Confusion—Survey Evidence of Consumer 
Demand and the Entire Market Value Rule, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 209, 
224 (2012) (arguing that it is impossible to give an absolute value to consumer 
demand for a feature).  
 As the statute only provides a floor of “reasonable” 
royalties, the courts have stepped in to provide guidance as to 
what constitutes adequate compensation. Damages will be 
 16. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 17. Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royal-
ties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 657–61 (2009). 
 18. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).  
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awarded based either on lost profits or on reasonable royal-
ties.19
A. CALCULATING PATENT DAMAGES 
 
1. Lost Profit 
The general rule when calculating patent damages is to de-
termine the sales and profits the patentee lost because of the 
infringement.20 In order to receive lost profits as actual damag-
es, the patentee must prove that there is a reasonable probabil-
ity that, but for the infringement, it would have made the in-
fringer’s sales.21 In Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 
Inc., the Sixth Circuit announced a commonly accepted stand-
ard for proving lost profits.22 The patent owner must prove: (1) 
demand for the patented product, (2) the absence of non-
infringing substitutes, (3) his ability to manufacture and mar-
ket the product to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of 
profit he would have made.23 The Panduit standard is demand-
ing and fact-specific, making it difficult to satisfy.24 Commenta-
tors have argued that the standard of proof is too high, and 
many patentees who should be entitled to receive lost profits 
are forced to seek lesser damages.25
2. Reasonable Royalties 
 
Not all patent infringement cases involve a lost-profit 
analysis, however.26
 
 19. See infra Parts I.A.1, I.A.2. 
 If a patentee cannot satisfy the require-
ments for proving lost profits, his damages must amount to at 
 20. Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 21. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989). 
 22. See id. (describing the Panduit test as the “standard way of proving 
lost profits”); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 
1156 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 23. State Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d at 1577; Panduit Corp., 575 F.2d at 1156. 
 24. Lemley, supra note 17, at 659–61. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See, e.g., LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 
57 (Fed. Cir. 2012). LaserDynamics existed solely to license patent '981 and 
had no ability to manufacture or market the product. Id. Therefore, 
LaserDynamics could not satisfy elements 3 or 4 of the Panduit test. Id.; see 
also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 11 (2012), 
available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/ 
assets/2012-patent-litigation-study.pdf (stating that lost profits accounted for 
32.2% of damage awards in patent litigation from 2006 to 2011).  
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least a reasonable royalty.27 Reasonable royalty calculations are 
an entirely different concept than the lost-profit approach: in-
stead of looking at lost sales, reasonable royalty cases inquire 
into what the marketplace would set as a reasonable license for 
the intellectual property.28 To arrive at a reasonable royalty, 
the royalty base is multiplied by the royalty rate.29 Courts often 
look toward the fifteen-factor Georgia-Pacific test for guidance 
when making the difficult, and often highly technical, determi-
nation of the royalty rate.30
Despite this exhaustive list of considerations, the Federal 
Circuit appears to view the fifteenth factor—the hypothetical 
agreement between the parties had they chosen to negotiate 
  
 
 27. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
 28. Lemley, supra note 17, at 661.  
 29. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW 
§ 7:5 (2012) (“All running royalties have at least two variables: the royalty 
base and the royalty rate.”); Love, supra note 12, at 266. 
 30. See Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). The factors most important for the purpose of this Note are 
factors 1, 2, and 15. The fifteen factors are: (1) the royalties received by the 
patentee for the licensing of the patent; (2) the rates paid by the licensee for 
the use of comparable patents; (3) the nature and scope of the license, as ex-
clusive or non-exclusive, or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory 
or with respect to whom the manufactured product may be sold; (4) the licen-
sor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent monop-
oly by not licensing others to use the invention; (5) the commercial relation-
ship between the licensor and licensee, such as whether they are competitors 
in the same territory or inventor and promoter; (6) the effect of selling the pa-
tented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the licensee, the exist-
ing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-
patented items, and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales; (7) the du-
ration of the patent and the license; (8) the established profitability of the 
product made under the patent and its commercial success and popularity; (9) 
the utility and advantage of the patent property over any existing old modes or 
devices used for similar purposes; (10) the nature of the patented invention 
and the benefits to those who have used the invention; (11) the extent to which 
the infringer has made use of the invention; (12) the portion of the profit or 
selling price customary in the particular business or comparable businesses to 
allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions; (13) the portion of 
the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished 
from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or 
improvements made by the infringer; (14) the testimony of experts; and (15) 
the amount that a licensor and licensee would have agreed upon (at the time 
infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to 
reach an agreement, that is, the amount that a prudent licensee would have 
been willing to pay as a royalty and be able to make a reasonable profit and 
which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee. Id. 
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from the outset—as the central consideration.31 When the court 
is contemplating this hypothetical negotiation between the par-
ties, it presumes that the patent is valid and that the risk and 
expense of litigation is not taken into account.32 This approach 
has been criticized, however, because it does not reflect the re-
ality of license negotiations.33
From a theoretical standpoint, patent damages for reason-
able royalties are generally lower than in lost profit cases be-
cause these patentees do not have the ability to sell the product 
on the open market.
 
34 Additionally, because reasonable royalty 
calculations take into account the possibility that the patentee 
will license the invention to several parties, the monopoly pow-
er is destroyed and each license becomes less valuable.35 In re-
ality, however, the difficult Panduit standard of proof means 
that many parties who lose profits because of infringement are 
forced to seek reasonable royalty damages because they cannot 
satisfy the Panduit requirements.36 One reason courts might 
award relatively high reasonable royalty damages is a desire to 
compensate parties who had difficulty overcoming the Panduit 
standard.37
 
 31. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (describing the hypothetical negotiations between the parties as the 
most common approach for calculating reasonable royalties).  
 These damages might not accurately reflect an ex 
 32. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 774 F. Supp. 1514, 1535 (E.D. Wis. 
1991), aff’d, 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 33. See Love, supra note 12, at 267–68. Love also criticizes the fifteenth 
Georgia-Pacific factor because the very fact that the parties are currently in 
litigation speaks to how they could not reach an agreement. Id. But see Thom-
as F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 1151, 1183–84 (2009) (identifying alternative approaches to calculat-
ing reasonable royalties).  
 34. See Lemley, supra note 17, at 661.  
 35. See id. at n.32 (“[A] patentee with market power will charge a profit-
maximizing monopoly price. By contrast, two companies in competition will 
charge a price lower than the monopoly price, generating less profit to share 
between them and more consumer surplus.”); Michael A. Greene, Note, All 
Your Base Are Belong to Us: Towards an Appropriate Usage and Definition of 
the “Entire Market Value” Rule in Reasonable Royalties Calculations, 53 B.C. 
L. REV. 233, 240 (2012). 
 36. See Lemley, supra note 17, at 667. 
 37. See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 980 (4th ed. 2007) (arguing that high reasonable royal-
ty awards serve as a way of compensating patentees for lost profits yet dis-
pensing with the high standard of proof); Lemley, supra note 17, at 667–68. 
But see Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2024 (2007) (stating that one potential reason for inflat-
ed reasonable royalty damages is that the accused infringer is reluctant to in-
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ante negotiation between the parties, but the Federal Circuit 
has rejected the argument that a reasonable royalty award 
could be so high that no prudent party would ever agree to such 
a figure in an ex ante negotiation.38
Because there is great potential for reasonable royalties to 
be skewed from a figure that parties would actually have 
agreed to ex ante, the courts have developed the concept of ap-
portionment to reduce potential damages in some cases.
  
39 To il-
lustrate, if a product is covered by a single patent, then the rate 
base will simply be the total sales value of the product.40 How-
ever, in an age of increasing technological sophistication, prod-
ucts that end up the subject of infringement squabbles are like-
ly to be covered by dozens, even hundreds, of patents. For 
example, Steve Jobs claimed that the patent portfolio for the 
iPhone was over 200 strong, and that figure does not include 
the patents Apple licensed from other companies to boost the 
capabilities of its product.41
then it follows that each one who has patented an improvement in 
any portion of a steam engine or other. . . complex machine may re-
cover the whole profits arising from the . . . whole machine, and the 
unfortunate [infringer] may be compelled to pay treble his whole prof-
its to each of a dozen or more several inventors of some small im-
provement in the engine . . . .
 These multifaceted devices create a 
problem: it is not fair to allow them to use the entire sales val-
ue of the product as the royalty base because other patents con-
tribute to the total value. The Supreme Court in Seymour v. 
McCormick stated that if a patentee could recover for damages 
on the whole product,  
42
To prevent patentees from receiving damages on patents 
they had no hand in creating, the Seymour Court developed the 
concept of apportionment.
 
43
 
troduce evidence that other patented components contributed to a product’s 
success out of fear that they might admit to infringing other patents). 
 Apportionment means that the 
same rule of damages cannot apply when a patent covers a 
 38. Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 39. See Love, supra note 12, at 268. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Lindsey Gilroy & Tammy D’Amato, How Many Patents Does It Take to 
Build an iPhone?, INTELL. PROP. TODAY (Nov. 2009), http://www 
.iptoday.com/issues/2009/11/articles/how-many-patents-take-build-iPhone.asp. 
This figure also does not include patents for iPhone features developed after 
2009, such as facial recognition software. See id.  
 42. Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 490 (1853).  
 43. See id. at 491. 
  
1150 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1143 
 
whole product and when it only covers a portion of a product.44 
This results in the court forcing patentees to adjust reasonable 
royalty calculations based on the percentage value their patent 
actually created. For example, in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. 
Gateway, Inc., the court used apportionment to reject a jury 
verdict because the royalty rate was not low enough to reflect 
the true value that the patentee actually created.45
B. THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE 
 
1. The Early History of the Entire Market Value Rule and the 
Apportionment Doctrine 
Apportionment has its limits, however. As early as 1884, 
the Supreme Court ruled that no apportionment is required if 
the patentee can show that “the entire value of the whole ma-
chine, as a marketable article, is properly and legally attribut-
able to the patented feature,” then damages can be calculated 
on the value of the whole device.46 Garretson v. Clark dealt with 
an improvement in the method of moving and securing the 
clamp of a mop head.47 Because the entire value of the mop 
head could not be attributed to the patent, damages could not 
be calculated on the sale price of the entire mop.48 Despite this 
ruling against the patentee, subsequent courts have allowed 
patentees to recover damages based on the sale of goods that 
are not part of the patented product at all, but merely sold in 
conjunction with the patented product.49
Garretson put forth the basic framework of the entire mar-
ket value rule: when a patent constitutes the entire basis for 
consumer demand, then profits or damages can be calculated 
on the value of the entire device.
 
50 The court also required that 
in every case, the patentee must produce evidence apportioning 
value between profits flowing from their invention and those 
stemming from the unpatented features.51
 
 44. See id. 
 To prevent the injus-
tice of a patentee being unable to recover because he could not 
produce evidence of apportionment when a clever infringer 
 45. Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 
2009).  
 46. Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 121–22. 
 49. Lemley, supra note 17, at 660. 
 50. Garretson, 111 U.S. at 121. 
 51. Id. 
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“smother[s] the patent with improvements belonging to them-
selves or to third persons,” the Supreme Court in Westinghouse 
Electricity & Manufacturing Co. v. Wagner Electric & Manufac-
turing Co. relieved patentees of their burden to prove appor-
tionment when the value of different patents are impossibly 
commingled.52 In such cases, the burden of showing apportion-
ment shifts to the defendant.53
Westinghouse drew criticism from the bar because it sup-
posedly awarded patent damages on the basis of procedural 
quibbles, such as the burden of proof, rather than on the actual 
merits of the case.
 The Westinghouse decision soon 
proved to be problematic, however. 
54 Further, apportionment proceedings were 
highly technical.55 Not only did they require the appointment of 
a special master to preside over them, they sometimes could 
last ten or twenty years after a determination of infringe-
ment.56 In 1946, Congress stepped in and eliminated the cum-
bersome apportionment proceedings and shifted patent damag-
es from recovering the infringer’s unjust enrichment to the 
current conception of providing compensation for the patent-
ee.57
2. The Expansion of the Entire Market Value Rule 
 
After Congress eliminated the tortuous Westinghouse re-
quirement, the courts began slowly expanding the ambit of the 
entire market value rule. In Tektronix v. United States, the 
plaintiff sued for the infringement of several oscilloscopes and 
lost profits on related unpatented plug-ins, which were physi-
cally separate from the oscilloscopes yet functionally useless 
without them.58
 
 52. See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 
U.S. 604, 615, 618–19 (1912).  
 Because the plug-ins were financially depend-
ent on the market created by the oscilloscopes, the court held 
that the scopes substantially created the value of the plug-ins, 
 53. See id. at 622. The Court justified this holding by declaring that the 
loss had to fall on the innocent or the guilty, and in such cases, the burden 
should be borne by the wrongdoer. Id. at 619. 
 54. See Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in 
the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 
321–22 (2006). 
 55. See id. at 322. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 323. 
 58. Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 351 (Ct. Cl. 1977), 
opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 557 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1977). Oscilloscopes 
are a type of device used to measure the wave shape of an electrical signal. Id.  
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and therefore the entire market value rule should apply, even 
though the two products were physically separate.59 Leesona 
Corp. v. United States relied upon Tektronix when determining 
reasonable royalties for mechanically rechargeable batteries 
and the attendant boxes, covers, cathode envelopes, and zinc 
anodes.60 The dispositive factor for application of the entire 
market value rule is not the physical joinder or separation of 
the contested items, but their financial and marketing depend-
ence.61 The court reasoned that because the very nature of the 
battery mandated that cathodes and anodes be replaced fre-
quently, the products were financially dependent and the entire 
market value rule should apply.62
The modern test for the application of the entire market 
value rule first appeared in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.
 
63 In 
order to receive damages on unpatented components sold with 
a patented apparatus, the components taken together must be 
the parts of a complex machine, or they must be a single func-
tional unit.64 Additionally, the patented feature must be the 
“basis of consumer demand.”65 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, 
Inc. shows this functional unit test in application66 Juicy Whip 
owned a patent for a juice dispenser that simulated the ap-
pearance that the beverage is created in front of the customer, 
although it was in fact pre-mixed.67
 
 59. See id. at 352.  
 The court held that Juicy 
Whip could introduce testimony regarding lost profit on sales of 
syrup customers used in their machines because the syrup and 
 60. Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 962, 974 (Ct. Cl. 1979).  
 61. Id. at 974. 
 62. See id. at 975. 
 63. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
Rite-Hite is also notable for being the first Federal Circuit case to mention the 
entire market value rule in the reasonable royalty context, although the case 
involved lost profits. See Landers, supra note 54, at 356.  
 64. See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1550. The patentee in this case sought to ap-
ply the entire market value rule to dock levelers used to bridge the gap be-
tween the loading dock and the vehicle, and vehicle restraints to secure the 
vehicle to the dock. Id. Because the products could be used independently of 
one another, the court concluded they did not constitute a single functioning 
unit. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1572. In Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., the Federal Cir-
cuit held that a rotary furnace used to produce fused silica constituted the ba-
sis of consumer demand for the end product of fused silica. 95 F.3d 1109, 
1118–19 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (per curiam). 
 66. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 382 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
 67. Id. at 1370.  
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the patented dispenser constituted a single functioning unit.68 
The district court had held that the items did not constitute a 
functional unit because Juicy Whip occasionally sold the syrup 
separately from the dispenser and because customers could use 
other syrups in the machine.69 The court noted, however, be-
cause the “dispenser needs syrup and the syrup is mixed in a 
dispenser,” the two constitute a single functioning unit.70
Despite the presence of legal standards limiting the appli-
cation of the entire market value rule, without vigilant judges, 
juries continue to rely erroneously on the rule to award exorbi-
tant damages to patentees.
 
71 For example, Lucent Technologies 
owned a patent for entering data into fields on a computer 
screen without using a keyboard.72 Lucent filed suit, alleging 
that Microsoft Money, Windows Mobile, and Microsoft Outlook 
infringed on their patent.73 Relying on Lucent’s invocation of 
the entire market value rule, the jury used the $8 billion total 
sales of the three products as a royalty base, and arrived at 
damages of $358 million.74 The Federal Circuit  struck down 
the jury verdict, stating that it misapplied the entire market 
value rule.75 However, the Chief Judge observed that “[t]here is 
nothing inherently wrong with using the market value of the 
entire product, especially when there is no established market 
value for the infringing component or feature, so long as the 
[royalty rate] accounts for the proportion of the base represent-
ed by the infringing component or feature.”76
 
 68. Id. at 1372–73.  
 Chief Judge 
Michel meant that so long as a large rate base is compensated 
by a comparatively low royalty rate, applying the entire market 
value rule will not result in excessive damages. However, the 
above excerpt from the Lucent decision seemingly opened the 
door a fraction for patentees to seek huge damage awards by 
making it easier for them to use the entire market value of a 
 69. Id. at 1372.  
 70. Id. 
 71. See Love, supra note 12, at 272. 
 72. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1323–24. 
 75. Id. at 1337 (holding that the patent at issue was only a very small 
component of a much larger software program and Lucent did not carry its ev-
identiary burden of proving that anyone purchased Outlook because of the pa-
tented method). 
 76. Id. at 1339. 
  
1154 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1143 
 
product as a rate base.77
Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard, Co. exemplifies how 
a low royalty rate can still lead to huge damage awards. Cor-
nell University owned a patent for a technology that issues 
multiple and out-of-order process instructions in a single clock 
cycle.
 Even if a royalty rate is very low, per-
haps below 1%, if the rate base is in the billions of dollars, the 
resultant damages will be quite high. Lucent is not the only ex-
ample of a case where a court has had to strike down an unrea-
sonable jury verdict based upon the entire market rule.  
78 Cornell had previously entered into licensing agree-
ments for the technology with Intel and IBM, but not Hewlett-
Packard.79 Although this technology is only one small compo-
nent of an entire computing system comprising large compo-
nents called ‘CPU bricks,’ the jury used Hewlett-Packard’s en-
tire revenue on these CPU bricks as a rate base.80 The jury 
applied a royalty rate of only 0.8%, but because the rate base 
exceeded $23 billion, the damages totaled $184 million.81 Judge 
Rader of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation, overturned 
the jury verdict ruling that Cornell was not entitled to use the 
entire market value rule in order to obtain the entire value of 
the CPU bricks as a rate base.82 “Simply put, Cornell’s failure 
to connect consumer demand for Hewlett-Packard machine 
‘performance’ to the claimed invention . . . undermined any ar-
gument for the applicability of the entire market value 
rule . . . .”83
3. Reigning in the Entire Market Value Rule 
 
Just as soon as the Federal Circuit seemed to be opening 
the floodgates in Lucent, it shut them again in Uniloc USA, Inc. 
v. Microsoft Corp. Uniloc owned a patent to deter the illegal 
copying of software.84
 
 77. See Peter E. Strand, Stuff That Genie Back in the Bottle: Stop Wishful 
Thinking About Royalty Base, Rate, and the EMVR, 24 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. 
L.J. 25, 25 (2012). 
 Microsoft infringed upon the technology 
 78. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard, Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283 
(N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 79. Id. at 291–92. 
 80. Id. at 287. Cornell had previously asked the jury to use HP’s entire 
revenue from servers and workstation as a rate base, but was forced to settle 
on CPU bricks when the court rejected its proposal. Id. at 287–88. 
 81. Id. at 282. 
 82. See id. at 289. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 
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in their Product Activation feature, which controlled access to 
XP, Word, and other Microsoft programs.85 This feature only 
represented a small fraction of the total capabilities of Word 
and Office, but Uniloc nevertheless applied the entire market 
value rule and used a royalty rate of 2.9% against the entire 
revenue of Windows and Microsoft Office.86 The jury awarded 
Uniloc $388 million.87
On appeal, Uniloc relied upon the statement of Chief Judge 
Michel that it is perfectly acceptable to use the entire value of a 
product as the rate base so long as the royalty rate is low to 
justify their use of the entire market value rule.
 
88 The Federal 
Circuit ruled that this statement was taken out of context, 
however, and the entire market value rule is a dangerous tool 
and must be limited.89 This danger flows from the fact that once 
a jury sees that the infringer obtained $19 billion in revenue 
from products containing the infringing patent, their concept of 
just damages will be irrevocably skewed.90 Uniloc was not cor-
rect in relying upon the entire market value rule because con-
sumers did not buy Windows or Office because of the Product 
Activation feature, and therefore it was not the basis for con-
sumer demand.91
LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc. is the most 
recent Federal Circuit case involving the entire market value 
rule.
 Uniloc appears to have set a new tone in the 
Federal Circuit’s approach to the entire market value rule and 
has been closely followed by subsequent decisions.  
92
 
2011). 
 LaserDynamics received a $52,000,000 verdict because 
their damages expert used the entire market value rule to get 
to a royalty rate totaling Quanta’s revenues from all of their 
laptops sold in the United States, and the jury accepted his tes-
 85. Id. at 1297–98. 
 86. Id. at 1311–12. Uniloc damages experts utilized the 25% rule of thumb 
to justify seeking such a significant award. Id. They estimated that the isolat-
ed value of the Product Activation was $10 and took 25% of that figure, hy-
pothesizing that 25% of the value goes to the patent owner and 75% to Mi-
crosoft. Id. They then multiplied the 225 million new Windows and Office 
products on the market by $2.50, arriving at a sum exceeding $564 million. Id. 
The Federal Circuit effectively ended the 25% rule of thumb in Uniloc. Id. at 
1315.  
 87. Id. at 1312. 
 88. Id. at 1319.  
 89. Id. at 1320. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1319. 
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 1–8 for a discussion of the case.  
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timony at face value.93 Because LaserDynamics failed to pro-
duce any evidence that their automatic disc discrimination fea-
ture drove consumer demand for laptops, the court held that 
the entire market value rule could not apply.94 The court em-
phasized that the entire market value rule is a “narrow excep-
tion to [the] general rule” and that simply using a very low roy-
alty rate does not relieve the patentee of the burden of 
demonstrating consumer demand for the patent.95
II.  THE FLAWED ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE   
 The recent 
decisions in Uniloc and LaserDynamics make clear that the 
Federal Circuit is taking a much more vigilant approach to con-
taining the entire market value rule. 
A. THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE HAS NO PLACE IN 
MODERN PATENT LAW 
Although the Federal Circuit96 has signaled the end of the 
expansion of the entire market value rule, the rule still has po-
tential to allow patentees to receive undeserved damage 
awards and is out of touch with the reality of modern technolo-
gy.97
 
 93. See LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 68 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 This Part argues that the entire market value rule can 
lead to unreasonable jury verdicts. Further, a rule stemming 
from a case involving a rotating mop head should not be ap-
plied to modern devices potentially containing hundreds of pa-
tents. Additionally, this Note argues that it is not possible for a 
manufacturer to truly show that a particular patent is actually 
driving the entire basis for consumer demand.  
 94. Id. (“It is not enough to merely show that the disc discrimination 
method is viewed as valuable, important, or even essential to the use of the 
laptop computer. Nor is it enough to show that a laptop computer without an 
ODD practicing the disc discrimination method would be commercially unvia-
ble.”).  
 95. See id. at 67. 
 96. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 gives the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ex-
clusive jurisdiction over final decisions of a district court of the United States 
arising under an Act of Congress relating to patents. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). 
The court provides a uniform interpretation of federal patent law throughout 
the nation. See Joseph R. Re, Brief Overview of the Jurisdiction of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Under § 1295(a)(1), 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 
651, 652 (2002).  
 97. See Greene, supra note 35, at 233; Love, supra note 12, at 264. 
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1. The Vagaries of Consumer Demand 
Garretson requires that for the entire market value rule to 
apply, the patent in question must provide the entire basis for 
consumer demand.98 But how can a patentee show her inven-
tion is truly driving the entire basis for consumer demand? One 
suggestion is to use survey evidence to provide insight into the 
minds of consumers.99 Theoretically, if a survey of a representa-
tive sample of consumers said that 100% of them would buy a 
product because of the patented feature, then the patentee has 
demonstrated that his product is driving the entire basis of 
consumer demand. But there are several problems with this 
approach. First, the question of why consumers buy what they 
buy is a particularly complex question: so complex in fact that 
consumer psychology is its own interdisciplinary field of 
study.100 Factors such as advertising, cost, product availability, 
consumer emotion, and the cultural background of the consum-
er all come into play when a consumer decides to buy a prod-
uct.101 The second problem is that surveys of consumer demand 
must include a control in order to avoid bias.102 The control typ-
ically constitutes another feature of the product in question, 
i.e., the survey will ask the consumer to rate the relative value 
of one feature as compared to another feature of the same 
product.103 Due to the presence of this control, consumer de-
mand for a product will always be measured relative to another 
feature of the product, not as an absolute value.104
Because of the multitude of factors that enter a consumer’s 
mind before they buy a product and the inherent limitations of 
the surveys themselves, a survey that showed a patented fea-
ture being responsible for 100% of consumer demand would be 
 
 
 98. Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884).  
 99. See Dyck, supra note 15, at 218. Survey evidence must be presented in 
accordance with the Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which provides that “[a]n 
expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has 
been made aware of or personally observed.” FED. R. EVID. 703. Courts have 
interpreted this to mean that an expert must conduct the survey, the expert 
must draw a representative sample, and the overall interviews must be per-
formed in accordance with objective statistics in the applicable field. Ways & 
Means, Inc. v. IVAC Corp., 506 F. Supp. 697, 704 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff’d, 638 
F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 100. Dyck, supra note 15, at 220–21. 
 101. Id. at 221.  
 102. Id. at 224. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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“highly suspicious.”105 Conceptually, it is difficult to see how a 
patented feature in a multifaceted device could ever actually be 
responsible for all consumer demand. If a device contained two 
patents, and one of the patents was the sole reason for consum-
ers buying the device, then the other patent would serve very 
little purpose. Such a device is unlikely to exist, as the licensing 
of a useless patent would essentially be throwing money 
away,106
The theoretical limitations of the entire market value do 
not seem to matter, however, as juries have shown repeatedly 
that they will accept the contention of patentees at face value 
that the patent is driving consumer demand. When consumers 
purchase a new laptop, they look to such features as processing 
power, the size of the screen, aesthetics, and battery life.
 and even if it did, its occurrence would be too rare to 
justify the existence of the entire market value rule. 
107 But 
the jury in LaserDynamics determined that the ODD device, a 
device that most jurors probably did not even know existed un-
til trial, was the sole reason that consumers decided to pur-
chase a laptop.108 The jury in Uniloc went even further than its 
counterpart in LaserDynamics by deciding that a product ac-
tively reviled by many consumers was in fact driving de-
mand.109 The product activation feature that Microsoft in-
fringed was so unpopular in fact, that when they released the 
technology, a senior company official acknowledged that the 
product would “tick off a lot of users.”110
 
 105. Id. at 224 n.81.  
 If a jury can apply the 
entire market value rule to a patent that drives some consum-
 106. Cf. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the 
United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 78 (2002) (stating that intel-
lectual property is becoming more central to a company’s value). 
 107. See Dave Oliver, Samsung Chromebook Review (2012 Model), WIRED 
UK, Oct. 31, 2012, http://www.wired.co.uk/reviews/laptops/2012-10/samsung 
-chromebook-review (reviewing the screen, speakers, battery, look, and weight 
of the computer, among other features). 
 108. See LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 63 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 109. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 110. Dave Wilson, Safeguards Punish Consumers, Not Pirates, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 25, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2001/oct/25/news/tt-61351. Microsoft 
used the product activation feature not to prevent piracy, as commonly be-
lieved, but to force users with multiple computers to buy a new copy of Win-
dows XP and Microsoft Office for each computer. Some went so far as to de-
scribe the feature as a “rapacious monopolist abusing computer users who are 
helpless to do anything about it.” Id. 
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ers not to purchase a product, then it is apparent that they do 
not understand the law correctly. 
The Federal Circuit has not provided sufficient clarity to 
the issue. Although in Uniloc and LaserDynamics the court 
tightened the application of the entire market value rule, in 
those cases it was clear that the patents did not even substan-
tially drive consumer demand.111 In a more borderline case, 
Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., the court allowed the 
application of the entire market value rule even though it 
acknowledged that the patented feature was not the entire ba-
sis for consumer demand.112 Without the unpatented syrup, the 
pre-mix dispenser would be useless, regardless of whether the 
two products constituted a single functioning unit.113 By stating 
that the dispenser “needs” syrup to function,114
2. The Changing Face of Technology 
 but then allow-
ing the patentee to utilize the entire market value rule to re-
cover lost profits on the sale of syrup, the court ignored the 
question of whether the dispenser constituted the entire basis 
for consumer demand.  
In 1884, the year the Supreme Court decided Garretson 
v. Clark, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
received 35,422 applications and granted 20,272 patents.115 In 
2011, the Patent and Trademark Office considered 535,188 ap-
plications and granted 246,684.116
 
 111. See supra notes 
 Not only has the volume of 
patent applications increased dramatically since Garretson v. 
Clark, but the entire nature of these patents has changed as 
107–10 and accompanying text.  
 112. 382 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY, http:// 
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 
2013). 
 116. Id. According to the 1890 census, the U.S. population in 1890 was al-
most 63 million, while the 2010 census counted nearly 309 million Americans. 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1. UNITED STATES - RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 
1790 TO 1990 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/ 
documentation/twps0056/tab01.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Resident Popula-
tion Data (Text Version), http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/ 
apportionment-pop-text.php (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). Population growth is 
not the only factor responsible for the increase in patent applications. Scholars 
have cited technological change, the increased economic value of patents, and 
the development of the Federal Circuit for the recent explosion in patent ap-
plications. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 106, at 78–79. 
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well.117 Historically, the bulk of patents seen by the PTO were 
mechanical patents, defined as “a process or product that con-
sists solely of the use of mechanical parts.”118 But the percent-
age of patents defined as mechanical is rapidly shrinking: a 
study of patents from 1976–78 found that around half of pa-
tents during this time were considered mechanical, yet from 
1996–98 less than a third of patents were for mechanical inven-
tions.119 Patents are also shifting away from traditional elec-
tronics. The bulk of the increase is seen in the fields of soft-
ware, biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals.120 The trend is 
clearly towards high-tech patents in the computing and bio-
technology industries where products consist of numerous pa-
tented inventions working together.121
This change is also evident in the profile of the inventors 
themselves.
 
122 Although there is a romanticized view in Ameri-
can culture of a solo inventor tinkering in his garage, the ma-
jority of inventions in the United States today are made by cor-
porations.123 In the 1996–98 sample, the median number of 
inventors per patent was 2.26, and 85% of all patentees as-
signed their invention to a corporate entity, typically an em-
ployer.124 Today’s popular consumer devices can illustrate the 
changing dynamics of patents. As previously discussed, a 
smartphone, such as the iPhone can contain hundreds of pa-
tents.125 Apple has even been successful in patenting features 
completely incidental to the main product, such as the wedge 
shape of its laptop computers.126
 
 117. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 
 Google is widely believed to 
106, at 79. Although this article fo-
cuses on the changes in the patent system from the 1970s to the 90s, it follows 
that the changes would be even more dramatic from the 1880s to today. 
 118. See id. at 89. Naturally, because electrical technology was only just 
developing in 1884, and computers and biotechnology were decades away, the 
PTO at the time of Garretson dealt almost exclusively in mechanical patents. 
Id.  
 119. See id. at 91–92.  
 120. Id. at 93–94.  
 121. See Love, supra note 12, at 264. 
 122. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 106, at 96.  
 123. See id. Nor is this even a particularly recent development. Allison & 
Lemley point out that from 1976–78, corporations owned more than three-
quarters of patents in their study. Id. at 97. 
 124. Id.  
 125. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  
 126. Roberto Baldwin, Apple Patents the Macbook Air’s Wedge Design—Bad 
News for Ultrabook Makers, WIRED, June 8, 2012, http://www.wired.com/ 
gadgetlab/2012/06/apple-patents-the-macbook-airs-wedge-design-bad-news 
-for-ultrabook-makers/. 
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have purchased Motorola Mobility because the company owned 
a portfolio of 17,000 patents covering its smartphones and oth-
er technologies.127 The paradigm that existed when the Su-
preme Court formulated the entire market value rule has shift-
ed drastically over 128 years. Technological devices today are 
much more complicated and the use of multiple patents is the 
norm, rather than the exception, yet juries are asked to apply a 
rule that is over 100 years old from a simpler era. Indeed, ju-
ries applied the entire market value rule in Lucent, Cornell 
University, Uniloc, and LaserDynamics: all cases involving 
highly complicated devices with dozens of patents.128
3. The Consequences of the Entire Market Value Rule 
 The na-
ture of innovation has progressed since Garretson v. Clark; the 
law should follow suit. 
Because it is almost never the case that a single patent is 
responsible for the entire value of a multifaceted device, the en-
tire market value rule overcompensates patentees by awarding 
damages on value they did not create.129 If patentees are al-
lowed to recover large, undeserved damage awards because of 
their patents, it will incentivize litigation and clog up the 
courts, as patentees may rush to the courthouse seeking huge 
jury verdicts.130 Patent litigation is expensive—even when less 
than $1,000,000 is at risk in patent litigation, the average total 
cost of litigation is $916,000131—and this cost may eventually be 
borne by consumers. The cost of litigation will be added to the 
high damage awards and the consumers will end up footing the 
bill.132
The potential for high damage awards through the entire 
market value rule also creates an incentive for patent 
trolling.
 
133
 
 127. David Goldman, Google Seals $13 Billion Motorola Buy, CNNMONEY 
(May 22, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/22/technology/google-motorola/ 
index.htm. 
 Patent trolling is a business model wherein a com-
 128. See supra Part I.B. 
 129. Lemley, supra note 17, at 663–64.  
 130. See Strand, supra note 77, at 25.  
 131. David E. Sosnowski, Resolving Patent Disputes via Mediation: The 
Federal Circuit and the ITC Find Success, 45 MD. B.J. 24, 26 (2012).  
 132. Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement 
Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 749 
(2002) (stating that in patent litigation, the cost of litigation “will be passed on 
to consumers like any other cost”). 
 133. See Love, supra note 12, at 281. 
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pany acquires the rights to patents, not to manufacture a prod-
uct, but for the sole purpose of obtaining money through in-
fringement damages and licensing fees.134 If a patentee can ob-
tain damages not just on his own patent, but an entire multi-
multifaceted device, then engaging in patent trolling becomes 
even more lucrative. Although some consider patent trolling to 
be a legitimate enterprise,135 if litigation is more profitable for 
patent owners than producing and marketing a product, inno-
vation will be stifled.136
B. SUGGESTED REMEDIES DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY ADDRESS THE 
PROBLEMS OF THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE  
 
The entire market value rule has been the subject of aca-
demic criticism, although few commentators have argued that 
the rule should be abolished.137 Suggested solutions to the prob-
lems created by the rule include a greater focus on the appor-
tionment of damages and limiting the rule to the realm of lost 
profits, but these remedies contain their own problems.138
1. Apportionment  
 
Although there is some consensus that the entire market 
value rule should be scaled back, such consensus does not exist 
on the proper way to do so. One suggestion is to return the en-
tire market value rule to its original role as a limited exception 
of the apportionment requirement.139 The entire market value 
rule should only apply when a product truly constitutes the en-
tire basis for consumer demand, and the alleged infringer 
should be allowed to present evidence of consumer demand for 
the unpatented components.140 If a patentee cannot show that 
the invention was the sole basis for consumer demand, then 
damages should be apportioned between the patented and un-
patented components.141
 
 134. Id. 
 
 135. See Landers, supra note 54, at 345.  
 136. See Love, supra note 12, at 281. 
 137. See, e.g., Landers, supra note 54, at 373–74; Lemley, supra note 17, at 
661–65. But see Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable 
Royalties in Patent Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 725, 735 (arguing that the entire market value rule should 
probably be done away with altogether). 
 138. See Cotter, supra note 137, at 736–39. 
 139. Love, supra note 12, at 272. 
 140. Id. at 292. 
 141. See id. at 268–69. 
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This approach has three problems, however. First, alleged 
infringers currently may be allowed to present evidence of con-
sumer demand, but often fail to do so.142 For example, in 
LaserDynamics, the court noted that Quanta’s motion for 
summary judgment neglected to challenge the use of a laptop 
computer as a royalty base, nor did its damages expert give any 
testimony on the issue of consumer demand.143 It is true that 
sometimes courts reject the introduction of such evidence be-
cause it requires collateral litigation over the existence and 
value of components not covered by the patent at trial.144 How-
ever, the accused infringer is often hesitant to introduce the ev-
idence at trial because they could potentially be admitting to 
infringing upon other patents.145
Second, this solution does not address one of the core prob-
lems of the entire market value rule: a multifaceted device 
where a single patent constitutes the entire basis for consumer 
demand is unlikely to exist.
 Because the infringer is hesi-
tant to introduce evidence of consumer demand, the use of the 
entire market value rule may often not be challenged at trial, 
meaning that the rule would continue to be misapplied.  
146 The benefits of retaining the en-
tire market value for that exceedingly rare circumstance are 
outweighed by its potentiality for abuse, particularly because 
the infringer is unlikely to challenge the application of the 
rule.147
Third, the apportionment of damages between the unpat-
ented components and the patented components is problematic 
for one of the same reasons as the entire market value rule. 
The proper apportionment of damages in the reasonable royal-
ties context requires a calculation of what value can be at-
tributed to the patented feature and what value can be at-
tributed to the unpatented features.
  
148
 
 142. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 
 Just as consumer 
37, at 2024. 
 143. LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 57 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
 144. Cf. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1358, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (Nies, J., dissenting) (“A reasonable royalty must be based on the value 
of the patented [components], not on other features in the infringing device.”). 
 145. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 37, at 2024–25. 
 146. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 147. Cf. Josh Friedman, Note, Apportionment: Shining the Light of Day on 
Patent Damages, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 147, 162 (2012) (noting opinions 
that current damages law, including the entire market value rule, encourages 
predatory litigation abuse).  
 148. See Love, supra note 12, at 268. 
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demand is difficult, if not impossible to quantify, the question 
of what value can be assigned to each patent would require 
byzantine and time-consuming calculations sure to bog the 
courts down in unnecessary procedure.149 Apportionment pro-
ceedings were an integral part of patent law after the Westing-
house decision, and the results were so negative that one mem-
ber of Congress described them as a “complete failure of justice 
in almost every case.”150
2. Limiting the Entire Market Value Rule to Lost Profits 
 A return to such a method might result 
in fairer damage awards, but the procedure is too complicated 
to be justified.  
Another suggested method to limit the entire market value 
rule is to apply it only to lost profits cases.151 It has been argued 
that the rule makes more sense in the lost profits context be-
cause if the majority of the value of a device is attributable to 
the patentee’s technology, then it is reasonable to conclude that 
the patentee would have sold the product but for the defend-
ant’s infringement.152 Proponents of retaining the rule for lost 
profits acknowledge that it is almost never the case where a pa-
tent is responsible for the entire value of a multi-faceted prod-
uct, but argue that this is immaterial because the infringer is 
still usurping sales of the patentee.153 But this argument fails to 
explain why the patentee should be allowed to recover lost prof-
its on value they did not create. Consider a product where the 
patent contributes the majority, but not all, of the value of the 
product and the defendant’s infringement deprives the patentee 
of the sale of that product. If the patentee had made the sale, 
they would have had to pay licenses to the holders of other pa-
tents in the device.154
 
 149. Landers, supra note 
 Therefore, any calculation of lost profits 
as a but-for cause of the infringement should take into account 
such licenses. If a patent is not creating the entire market val-
ue of a product, then the patentee should not be compensated 
as if it were. Because the entire market value rule is still 
54, at 313. 
 150. Id. at 313 n.25. 
 151. See Lemley, supra note 17, at 662–63. 
 152. Id. at 663.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Cf. Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (indicating that such contracts between licensors and licen-
sees generally exist in a product containing patented components from multi-
ple patentees).  
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fraught with numerous problems despite the Uniloc and 
LaserDynamics decisions, it should be eliminated entirely.  
III.  ELIMINATING THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE 
AND RECONSTRUCTING HYPOTHETICAL 
NEGOTIATIONS   
A. HOW THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE COULD BE 
ELIMINATED 
Discarding the entire market value rule completely is the 
surest way to prevent its misapplication in the future. The 
Federal Circuit has limited the rule’s scope in the past several 
years, but it was only recently that the Court expanded the en-
tire market value rule to reasonable royalty cases in Rite-
Hite.155
In terms of lost profits, the entire market value rule can 
easily be eliminated by ensuring that the damage award is an 
accurate reflection of the profits the patentee would have re-
ceived but for the infringement.
 The composition of courts change, and future judges 
might be less vigilant in policing the use of the entire market 
value rule. 
156 This means that damages 
should take into account the licensing arrangements that the 
patentee made for the use of other patents in the product. 
There is evidence that the Federal Circuit already endorses 
this approach and applies the entire market value rule only 
rarely in the realm of lost profits.157
The framework already exists for removing the entire 
market value rule for reasonable royalties and ensuring that 
patentees do not receive damages for value they did not cre-
ate.
 
158 Many courts treat the fifteenth Georgia-Pacific factor, 
i.e., reconstructing hypothetical negotiations between the par-
ties before the infringement, as the proper method for deter-
mining reasonable royalties.159 At least one scholar has advo-
cated this approach,160 although it has been criticized as purely 
speculative161
 
 155. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  
 given that the very fact of infringement suggests 
 156. See Cotter, supra note 137, at 749. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Georgia-Pac. Corp, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
 159. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 160. See Cotter, supra note 137, at 751.  
 161. See Love, supra note 12, at 267. 
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that the two parties were quite unwilling to negotiate ex 
ante.162 But Georgia-Pacific factors one and two—previous roy-
alties received by the patentee and the rates paid by the licen-
see in the past for comparable patents—are often available to 
obviate the court’s need to attempt to reconstruct a fictitious 
negotiation process.163
If a sufficient licensing history for a multi-faceted device 
exists, this licensing history should be the foremost considera-
tion for the trier fact when calculating damages. Instead of re-
lying on an immensely complicated fifteen-factor test or trying 
to step into the minds of the parties and speculate as to what 
they might have done, a jury would look at the licensing history 
and arrive at a reasonable damages calculation. The Federal 
Circuit should continue the trend they started in Uniloc and 
LaserDynamics and eliminate the entire market value rule the 
next time it is an issue on appeal. By eliminating the rule and 
explicitly stating that Georgia-Pacific factors one and two 
should be the foremost consideration of the trier of fact, the 
Federal Circuit can lessen the risk that patentees are overcom-
pensated and provide an easier method for juries to calculate 
damages.  
 
There have been calls to eliminate or severely limit the en-
tire market rule in the past,164 but the solution proposed by this 
Note is novel because it would make prior licensing history the 
most important factor when calculating damages. Professor 
Cotter argues that the prior licensing history should only be 
one factor that the trier of fact considers when awarding rea-
sonable royalties.165 Other factors that he argues should play a 
role are the expected value of the patented invention in com-
parison with the next-best alternative, the existence and 
strength of other patented inventions incorporated into the end 
product, and the use of realistic royalty rates and bases.166 But 
Professor Cotter’s proposal still forces the trier of fact to specu-
late as to what the parties would have agreed to had they de-
cided to negotiate before the infringement.167
 
 162. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 
(6th Cir. 1978). 
 Focusing instead 
on prior licensing agreements means that damages are tied to 
 163. See, e.g., Georgia-Pac. Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.  
 164. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 137, at 735; Love, supra note 12 at 264. 
 165. Cotter, supra note 137, at 741.  
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 741–42. 
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reality: what the patentee has actually agreed the patent was 
worth in the past. Tying damages to prior licenses also elimi-
nates the problematic royalty rates and royalty bases, which 
the patentee can manipulate into receiving undeserved damage 
awards.  
If there is ample evidence available of previous royalties 
received by the patentee or of previous licenses paid by the in-
fringer for similar products, then the courts do not need to look 
to Georgia-Pacific factor 15. Both the patentee and the alleged 
infringer can proffer evidence of what sums had been paid pre-
viously and present to the jury a figure that they believe is rea-
sonable in light of these past arrangements. Of course, the jury 
must adjust the figure upwards to provide compensation for the 
infringement; otherwise there would be no incentive for a prod-
uct manufacturer to ever pay for a license.168
B. APPLYING GEORGIA-PACIFIC FACTORS ONE AND TWO TO 
PRIOR CASES AND POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS OF THE SOLUTION 
  
The effectiveness of using Georgia-Pacific factors one and 
two when calculating damages can be seen by examining sev-
eral of the cases previously discussed. For example, in 
LaserDynamics, the company had entered into 29 licensing 
agreements all for lump sum payments of less than $1 mil-
lion.169 If there is evidence of such lump sum payments availa-
ble, there is little need to engage in difficult mathematic calcu-
lations involving rate bases and royalty rates. As demonstrated 
above,170 the very concept of royalty rates can be used to confuse 
juries into thinking they are awarding reasonable damages 
when a high rate base is multiplied by a very low royalty 
rate.171
This solution could also have been applied effectively in 
Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard, Co. Cornell had reached 
licensing agreements for the use of its technology with IBM and 
Intel, meaning evidence existed on the record of what value 
Cornell and third parties attributed to use of the invention.
  
172
 
 168. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 
(6th Cir. 1978) (stating that if the court did not compensate for infringement, 
the infringer will be in a “heads-I-win, tails-you-lose position”). 
 
 169. LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 58 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
 170. See supra text accompanying note 80. 
 171. See Strand, supra note 77, at 25.  
 172. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 291–
92 (N.D.N.Y. 2009); see also supra text accompanying note 80. In fact, because 
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In order to calculate damages, the jury could merely have ex-
amined these prior licensing agreements, made appropriate ad-
justments for inflation, penalized Hewlett-Packard for the in-
fringement, and arrived at a reasonable figure. Instead, Cornell 
muddied the waters by introducing the inapposite entire mar-
ket value and disguised an enormous royalty base through a 
seemingly low royalty rate of 0.8%.173
Although Judge Rader in Cornell greatly reduced the dam-
ages awarded, he did so by applying the 0.8% royalty rate on a 
much smaller royalty base.
  
174 But this approach is potentially 
problematic because it can be inconsistent with patent licens-
ing agreements. Often prior licensing agreements are lump 
sum payments and make no mention of royalties. For example, 
in Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, Inc. the judge rejected Mirror 
World’s proposed royalty rate because none of Apple’s previous 
licensing agreements for the technology in question involved 
royalties, but were instead lump sum payments.175
In LaserDynamics, the damages expert for Quanta Com-
puter essentially relied upon the proposed solution.
 If previous 
licensing agreements involved lump sum payments, then juries 
(and judges) should have no need to engage in complicated dis-
cussions over what the proper royalty base and rate should be.  
176 He exam-
ined the previous licenses and testified that a $500,000 lump 
sum payment would be a reasonable royalty.177 LaserDynamics 
contended that this figure was too low because the growth in 
the DVD market had made their patent more valuable since 
they had entered into those licensing agreements.178 But in-
stead of using these licenses as a baseline figure and increasing 
this figure based on the rise in value of their patent and to pun-
ish the infringer, they applied a royalty rate of 2% to a rate 
base consisting of Quanta’s total sales of laptop computers.179
 
Intel’s licensing agreement allowed Intel to sell the processors to third parties, 
and HP then bought the processors, HP had an implied license with Cornell 
and was not liable for infringement with regards to processors bought from 
Intel. Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 291. 
 
 173. Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 292. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 703, 727 (E.D. Tex. 
2011). 
 176. See LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 62 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 61. 
 179. Id. at 60. 
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This method of calculation, out-of-touch with any of their previ-
ous licensing agreements and inappropriately relying upon the 
entire market value rule, resulted in an exorbitant jury ver-
dict.180
A drawback to this solution is that prior licensing agree-
ments will not always exist for juries to rely upon when calcu-
lating damages. If the patent is very new, or if the patentee 
produced the product himself and did not license the invention, 
then no licensing history will exist to aid decision makers. But 
there are many incentives for patentees to license a product, 
meaning if a technology is involved in a licensing dispute, it is 
likely that prior licensing agreements will exist for similar 
technologies. Smaller firms may lack the resources to success-
fully take a product to market, and will thus need to rely on li-
censing agreements with firms with greater resources to mar-
ket the technology.
  
181 Larger firms see licensing as a way to 
cheaply acquire new technology without the costs of research 
and development.182
If there is evidence on the record of previous lump sum 
royalty payments, the reasonable royalty award should reflect 
these previous payments, adjusted upwards to compensate for 
the infringement. If, however, the previous royalty payments 
were not lump sums but percentage royalties, then the reason-
able royalty award should reflect the previous agreements, 
with a similar royalty rate and royalty base. The first two 
Georgia-Pacific factors, not the fifteenth, should be given the 
highest importance. With the entire market value rule elimi-
nated and reasonable royalty awards based off of previous li-
censing agreements, patentees will receive fairer verdicts on 
value they actually had a hand in creating. 
 And if a licensing history truly does not ex-
ist, then courts can utilize the fifteenth Georgia-Pacific factor 
and reconstruct ex ante negotiations between the parties with-
out ever having to invoke the entire market value rule. 
  CONCLUSION   
Patentees should not be allowed to use their patents as 
tools for seeking out infringers and slapping them with huge 
damage awards in litigation. Allowing this will only encourage 
unnecessary litigation and lessen incentives for companies to 
 
 180. Id. at 80. 
 181. Harold J. Evans, Introduction to Technology Licensing, 35 ARK. LAW., 
Winter 2000, at 16, 16. 
 182. Id. 
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actually manufacture and market products for sale. The entire 
market value rule is one such way that patentees can use their 
patent as a sword to reap undeserved damages. This note has 
examined the history of the entire market value rule and criti-
cized the rule for being anachronistic and resting on unsound 
theoretical footing. By abandoning the entire market value rule 
and using previous licensing agreements as a guideline for 
damages, patentees will be reasonably compensated for inap-
propriate use of their inventions, but not more than they de-
serve. The Constitution states that patents should be protected 
“in order to promote the progress of science and useful arts,”183
 
 
and a revocation of the entire market value rule and a more 
reasonable method of calculating damages will help ensure that 
the patent system fulfills its function of promoting innovation. 
 
 183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
